This paper examines persistence of raw and risk-adjusted returns for long/short equity hedge funds using the portfolio approach of Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) . Only limited evidence of persistence is found for raw returns. Funds with the highest raw returns last year continue to outperform over the subsequent year, although not significantly while there is no persistence in returns beyond one year. In contrast, we find performance persistence based on risk-adjusted return measures such as the Sharpe Ratio and in particular an alpha from a multifactor model. Funds with the highest risk-adjusted performance continue to significantly outperform in the following year. The persistence does not last longer than one year except for the worst performers. Funds with significant risk-adjusted returns show less exposure to the market, have high raw returns and low volatility. These results are robust to adjustments for stale prices and subperiod analysis.
Introduction
Studies examining the persistence of hedge fund performance vary a lot in their conclusions due to different methodologies, databases, investigation periods, and performance measures (e.g., Eling, 2007) . This paper does not consider various approaches to clarify the picture, but instead, focuses on a particularly flexible one. Every period, hedge funds are sorted into portfolios according to characteristics in the last period and then the portfolios are tracked for the next period. After the tracking period, the sorting is repeated. This approach has been used in the mutual fund literature by Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) and Carhart (1997) among others and has several advantages. First, portfolio betas may be more stable than betas of individual funds because time-varying betas can offset each other on the portfolio level. This is particularly relevant for hedge funds: As they have fewer restrictions on borrowing, shorting, the use of derivatives etc., they typically follow highly opportunistic strategies that lead to time-varying risk exposures. Moreover, beta measurement is more precise due to diversification of idiosyncratic risk and long time series for the portfolio returns.
Finally, suppose there is only a very small autocorrelation in fund returns. Given the high return variance, it is difficult to detect this correlation by looking at individual funds. As in the case of momentum strategies, we have to buy a portfolio of last period's winners, not just one fund, to see persistence.
This paper extends the current literature in several directions. First, by restricting the sample to long/short equity hedge funds, the number of (risk) factors can be greatly reduced while the explanatory power of the factor models is maximized. In fact, the widely used factor models generally exhibit a very high explanatory power for the equity long/short strategy -in absolute terms as well as relative to other strategies (e.g., Fung and Hsieh, 2002; Fung and Hsieh, 2006) . Given only monthly observations of hedge fund returns, a low number of parameters is desirable as it renders inference more robust due to conservation of degrees of freedom and mitigation of multicollinearity problems. Secondly and related, 3 prior studies generally pool different hedge fund strategies and analyze them jointly (e.g., Boyson and Cooper, 2004; Capocci, 2007) . This can be susceptible to the problem of model misspecification: Alpha portfolios may contain funds of the same strategy because neglected risk factors for this strategy show up as alpha. Hence, results focusing on one particular strategy may be more robust. Thirdly, possible nonlinear market exposure is accounted for by including option returns as risk factors. Naik (2000, 2004) find that the systematic risk exposure of hedge funds can include option-based strategies. However, no such exposure has been found for long/short equity hedge funds on the aggregate level (Fung and Hsieh, 2006; . Individual funds, on the other hand, may well show nonlinear market exposure and it may be important to account for nonlinearities when evaluating performance. Finally, we consider sorts based on regression coefficients. In order to examine the nature of return persistence, it is important to know whether the momentum loading of funds persists and whether these funds outperform.
The analysis in this paper is interesting for several reasons. First, repeatedly forming a portfolio based on observable information and tracking it for the next period represents a trading strategy which is conceptually easily implementable. Practically, however, the typical investor faces lockup periods prohibiting him from exploiting these strategies. Still, they may be interesting for funds of funds that are able to waive lockup periods (Boyson and Cooper, 2004) . Secondly, performance persistence may be more important for hedge funds than for mutual funds due to their higher attrition rates (Capocci, Corhay, and Huebner, 2005) . By looking at funds' transition probabilities of moving from one portfolio to another and by tracking a portfolio not only one year but several years, one gets a clearer picture of the persistence.
After a short overview of the literature, the factor model is introduced and applied on the index level. Next, we present the dataset and sample selection procedures. The discussion of the results is the main part and focuses on the persistence of raw returns as well as risk-4 adjusted performance measures. In order to mitigate spurious results, various robustness tests are performed before a conclusion is reached.
Literature overview
While the performance of mutual funds has been extensively studied in the academic literature, there is a growing body of literature on hedge fund performance persistence. Even more than in the mutual fund literature, there is a large variance in the conclusions drawn by the studies examining persistence of hedge fund performance. A recent overview of the literature on persistence of hedge fund performance is provided by Eling (2007) . He shows that these studies differ widely in methodology, database, investigation period, performance measures and conclusions. To obtain a clearer picture, at a minimum, persistence of raw returns and risk-adjusted returns have to be distinguished. Harri and Brorsen (2004) report short-term persistence of three to four months with the biggest effect in the first month based on simple regressions of returns on lagged returns.
Over the quarterly horizon (portfolios are reformed quarterly), Boyson and Cooper (2004) obtain a monthly return spread of more than 1.14% using a pool of all hedge fund strategies.
For the annual horizon, Baquero, Jenke, and Verbeek (2004) find an insignificant spread of an annual 4.9% and an annual spread of 11.5% at the quarterly horizon. Clearly, the smaller the horizon the stronger the persistence in performance as measured by raw returns. Overall, the literature is in favor of short-term persistence over horizons of up to six months but is mixed with respect to annual persistence (Eling, 2007) .
The evidence on the persistence of risk-adjusted performance is particularly mixed as there are various methods and performance measures. Amenc, Curtis, and Martellini (2003) show that different models strongly disagree on the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds because there is a large dispersion of alphas across models. Still, they generally tend to rank the funds in a similar way. Common factor choices for hedge fund (risk) factors are the three 5 Fama-French factors, Carhart's (1997) Persistence can be examined using simple autoregressions, Spearman's rank correlation, and contingency tables as the most prominent methods. The evidence is mixed, however. For example, while Agarwal and Naik (2000) find no persistence beyond the quarterly horizon, Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2005) and Edwards and Caglayan (2001) report annual persistence.
One prominent method introduced by Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) and used in the mutual fund literature (e.g., Carhart, 1997; Davis, 2001) consists of repeatedly forming portfolios of funds based on lagged characteristics and tracking them for the next period. Boyson and Cooper (2004) sort on characteristics other than returns or alpha for hedge funds.
While they find no persistence when sorting on past performance alone, considering manager tenure in addition leads to the finding of quarterly persistence. The persistence is mainly concentrated in the poor performers. However, considering all hedge fund strategies jointly, they use up to 20 factors to end up with an R² of around 0.75. Capocci (2007) sorts portfolios based on additional properties of the return distribution. He finds that portfolios of funds with the highest lagged Sharpe Ratio deliver positive alpha. The same holds for funds with the lowest volatility and, to a lesser extent, funds with low market beta. Sorting portfolios based on higher moments of the return distribution or lagged alpha, however, does not detect a significant alpha spread between top and bottom portfolios.
1 The factors are returns to primitive trend-following strategies of rolling over lookback-straddles on commodity, foreign exchange and bond futures. The owner of a lookback call (put) option has the right to buy (sell) the underlying at the lowest (highest) price over the life of the option. The combination of these is a lookback-straddle. 2 These factors are returns from rolling over call and puts of different moneyness with a broad market index as the underlying.
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Model

Portfolio formation
The methodology to form portfolios is based on Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1993) .
On January 1st of each year, portfolios of hedge funds are formed based on specific characteristics during the formation period and tracked for the subsequent year. Then, the portfolios are reformed. The portfolios are numbered from 1 to 10, whereas portfolio 1 contains the 10% of funds with, for example, the highest lagged returns and portfolio 10 contains the 10% of funds with the lowest lagged returns. The weights of the funds in the portfolios are equal and readjusted whenever a fund disappears during the tracking year. To provide additional information, the deciles 1 and 10 are further subdivided into terciles, indicated by capital letters A, B and C. Also, a portfolio which is long in portfolio 1 and short in portfolio 10 (long 1A and short 10C) is analyzed.
In this paper, the tracking horizon is one year for two reasons. First, quarterly or even monthly reforming of a portfolio would be difficult to implement as a trading strategy due to lock-in periods. Secondly, because of illiquidity or managed prices, hedge fund managers have leeway in marking their positions for month-end reporting. This flexibility can be used to artificially reduce return volatility or market beta. The resulting returns spuriously show short-term autocorrelation known as 'stale prices' (Asness, Krail, and Liew, 2001; Getmansky, Lo, and Marakov, 2004) which shows up as short-term persistence in returns. Frequent portfolio reforming may therefore just take up this autocorrelation. Focusing on the one-year horizon alleviates this problem. In the robustness section, we also explicitly control for 'stale prices'.
Factor benchmark and alpha
The first hedge fund was founded by Albert Winslow Jones in 1949 and involved simultaneous investments in long and short stock positions. Today, this strategy is being referred to as 'long/short equity' as one particular style among others like global macro or merger arbitrage. Despite being a relatively old strategy, interest has remained strong. About 40% of all funds provided by the CISDM database follow this strategy. A similar fraction holds for other databases, e.g. TASS (Fung and Hsieh, 2004) .
Long/short equity is a directional strategy which invests on both the long and short side of the market. A long/short equity manager typically shorts stocks that he believes are overvalued and invests in more attractive stocks. Shorting stocks serves at least three purposes: It can generate excess returns above a benchmark, hedge market (and other) risk and managers can either use the proceeds of the short sale to finance the long positions or earn interest on them (Fung and Hsieh, 2006) . Equity long/short hedge funds generally exhibit a long-bias. However, the funds are by no means a homogenous group. Some managers attempt market neutrality while others choose a short bias. Moreover, they can vary their exposure over time.
Long/short equity funds shift from small to large caps, from growth to value, from momentum to contrarian, and from long to short positions in stocks. Additionally, managers can use derivatives and debt financing for leveraging. The focus can be regional, such as long/short U.S.
and European equity, or sector specific, such as long/short utilities and technology. According to Asness, Krail, and Liew (2001) , the holdings of these funds tend to be substantially more concentrated than those of traditional stock funds. Summarizing, contrary to the buy-and-hold approach of most mutual funds, hedge funds employ dynamic strategies in a wide range of asset classes, use derivatives, and can be highly leveraged.
There are various reasons why hedge funds may show nonlinear market exposure: Hedge funds are allowed to trade in derivatives and can employ option-like trading strategies. Agarwal and Naik (2004) find significant exposure of most hedge fund strategies to the return of repeatedly buying and selling index options. Many strategies seem to behave like writing outof-the-money put options on the market index. As an example, suppose writing put options is a profitable strategy over the time period considered. Then, the portfolio of past winners may contain more put writers. As Glosten and Jagannathan (1994) show, such nonlinear payoffs can outperform a linear benchmark. Hence, not including option factors could spuriously indicate outperformance and neglect systematic (tail) risk.
The investment flexibility of hedge funds makes performance assessment more difficult.
Style-drift and exposure to a wide range of asset classes, possibly even nonlinear, must be accounted for. Given the limited amount of data, this task can only be dealt with on a rudimentary level. Possible nonlinearities are accounted for by including option-based strategies, using a rolling-window approach, and performing an analysis of subperiods which may mitigate the effects of style-drift.
As hedge funds typically employ dynamic strategies, the static CAPM is an inappropriate benchmark. For long/short equity funds, Fung and Hsieh (2006) show that the overall market and the spread between large and small cap stocks account for over 80% of return variation on the index level. Combined with a momentum factor, they find it unlikely to have omitted an important risk factor. Hence, long/short equity returns can be well captured using the FamaFrench factors, a momentum factor and option factors to account for possible nonlinearities.
This can be represented with the following model that extends Carhart's (1997) four-factor model.
The left-hand side is the excess return of portfolio i in month t. RMRF is the excess return on the market portfolio, proxied by the value-weighted return on all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks minus the one-month Treasury bill rate. SMB is the excess return of the factor-mimicking portfolio for size, HML is the excess return of the factor-mimicking portfolio for book-to-market equity, and MOM is the excess return of the factor-mimicking portfolio for one-year momentum.
3 and Fung and Hsieh (2001) show that hedge funds can have exposure to option returns on standard asset classes. use returns of rolling-over put and call options on the S&P 500. Here, a procedure very similar to Agarwal and Naik (2004) is employed to obtain out-of-the-money (OTM) call and put option factors on the S&P 500 index: On the first trading day in January, an OTM option on the S&P 500 is bought that expires on the first trading day in February. On the first trading day in February either the option is exercised or not. For a call option, for example, the return is calculated
where S is the value of the S&P 500 index, K the strike price and C the call price in the respective months. Then, the same type of option maturing on the first trading day in March is bought. For the OTM call (put) options, the strike price is 101
(99) percent of the S&P 500 at the time of purchase. 4 Here, option prices are calculated using the Black-Scholes formula for pricing European style options. Using historic volatility of the underlying, it is known that Black-Scholes does not price options well that are deep in-or outof-the-money. As a compromise only OTM call and put factors are used with strike price of 101 (99) percent of the S&P 500 index value. This happens to be the ratio used for their out-of-the-money factors. 5 By subtracting the riskfree rate from returns of the rolling-over option strategy, one obtains the out-of-the-money call (OTMC) and out-ofthe-money put (OTMP) factors.
3 These factors are provided by Kenneth French on http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french. 4 use market prices but their data is currently only available until January 2005.
9 5 also use at-the-money option factors. Due to the high correlation of option factors of similar moneyness, these are left out. Besides, especially the OTM put factor has been significant in . The correlation of their series and the one used here is around 0.85 for both OTM put and call options. The volatility of the underlying is estimated using the realized standard deviation of the S&P 500 index during the preceding month. Data on the S&P 500 and the dividend yield was obtained from Datastream and the risk free rate from Kenneth French's Data Library.
Performance at the index level
The CISDM equity long/short index shows the median performance of equity long/short hedge funds reporting to the CISDM database. However, the hedge fund index is not investable and may suffer from various biases which are discussed below. Figure 1a compares its performance to the S&P 500. Obviously, the average long/short equity hedge fund shows strong market exposure until the year 2000, where it was smart to reduce the exposure. After the market downturn, the hedge funds again took advantage of rising stock prices. The performance of the long/short strategy matches very closely the performance of the average hedge fund across all strategies. This reflects the dominance of long/short equity hedge funds in the database as other strategies performed markedly different. Overall, the strategy clearly outperformed the market benchmark and had a long exposure to the market as Figure 1b shows. As argued above, the market is an inappropriate benchmark. Applying the factor model above shows that the index outperforms the more demanding multifactor benchmark. Table 1 displays a monthly outperformance of 0.33%. The factor loadings show significant exposure 10 to the market, small stocks and last year's winner stocks. The exposure to value stocks is very small as the marginally significant HML loading shows. The option factors were not able to capture any nonlinear market exposure, however. These coefficients are consistent with and Fung and Hsieh (2006 6 Correcting for 'stale prices' by including lagged factors as additional regressors increases R 2 adj. to 0.84 and decreases alpha from 0.33 to 0.28. Alpha still remains highly significant. 7 The difference between returns of surviving and all funds is a monthly 0.084% considering all hedge funds and 0.074% for long/short equity using data from 1973 to 2005. This is close to Eling's (2007) 0.08% for the CISDM database and at the lower end when compared to estimates from other databases. Restricting the timespan to 1994 -2005 increases the return difference to 0.12% and 0.11%, respectively, as CISDM started to keep defunct funds in the sample. 12 funds are classified as equity long/short funds. The following list shows the selection criteria for the funds which are included in our final sample.
• Funds that appear multiple times were deleted. This was considered to be the case when funds had the same name and company ID. Then, only the funds in USD were kept in the sample resulting in the deletion of 85 funds.
• The period considered ranges from January 1994 until December 2005 resulting in 144 monthly observations. Only data from 1994 onwards is used as CISDM did not start to keep track of both life and defunct funds before. This results in the exclusion of 35 funds that have no observations during this period.
• To correct for the backfill bias, the first 12 observations of every fund are excluded. In addition, at least 12 observations are needed to sort the funds in the formation period. 
Empirical results
Persistence of raw returns
An important question for hedge fund investors is whether past performance is indicative of future performance. So far, private and institutional investors clearly allocate more funds to past good performers. For mutual funds, Sirri and Tufano (1998) find large inflows into last year's winners and large withdrawals from last year's worst performers. For hedge funds, Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai (2008) document that alpha funds attract more capital in-13 flows than beta-only funds and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2004) find that: "...funds with persistently good (bad) performance attract larger (smaller) inflows compared to those that show no persistence" (p. 2). Hence, in the presence of performance persistence, an investor may be able to realize superior performance. Table 2 : Portfolios of hedge funds formed on lagged 1-year raw returns Each January from 1995 until 2005, decile portfolios based on lagged 1-year returns are formed. Portfolio 1 contains funds with the highest 1-year returns, portfolio 10 funds with the lowest 1-year returns. Portfolios 1 and 10 are further divided into terciles. The portfolios are equal-weighted and the weights are readjusted whenever a fund disappears. RMRF, HML and SMB are the Fama-French (1993) factors for market proxy and factor-mimicking portfolios for book-to-market and size. MOM is a factor-mimicking portfolio for one-year momentum. Alpha is the constant of the model. Newey-West (1987) Table 2 reports the performance persistence in raw returns based on 10 portfolios of funds that are sorted according to their lagged 1-year raw returns. The table reveals quite some variation in mean returns. The mean returns tend to decrease in portfolio rank resulting in an annualized spread of 4.78% between portfolio 1 and 10. However, this spread is not significant with a monthly mean of 0.39% and standard deviation of 0.50%. Moreover, the mean returns do not decrease monotonically. Because of the tendency for winners to remain winners, there seems to be weak evidence for 'hot hands' (Hendricks, Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1993) Our results indicate that, assuming normality for simplicity, the probability that last year's winners exhibit a positive return over the next month is 57 . 0 46 . 0
where T is equal to 132. Moreover, the extreme portfolios have a higher return variance than portfolios in the inner deciles, possibly due to higher leverage or generally riskier strategies. This is consistent with Herzberg and Mozes (2003) who find that the funds with the highest past returns have the highest volatility.
When we alternatively adjust the raw returns for risk by using an alpha from a Carhart (1997) four factor model, the spread in performance disappears. In fact, portfolio 10 has a (insignificantly) higher alpha than portfolio 1. It is interesting to see that the significant alphas are located in the inner deciles (portfolios 3, 4, 6, and 9) while the portfolio of last year's winners does not outperform against the benchmark model. Instead, they show more return variation that eventually places them in more extreme deciles. The alpha portfolios, however, show relatively little return variance. This indicates that, on average, alpha funds are characterized not only by high returns but also low volatility. 8 In fact, portfolios 3, 4, and 6 have the three highest Sharpe Ratios and portfolio 9 the sixth highest Sharpe Ratio (not reported).
Looking at the factor loadings, the coefficient on RMRF is around 0.5 and shows no specific pattern. With respect to HML, there seems to be a tendency of last year's winners to be more growth-oriented while other deciles have more of a value focus, though coefficients are generally small and insignificant. More revealing is the pattern of the SMB coefficients. All portfolios have positive exposure, which confirms earlier findings that long/short funds are 15 small cap oriented Fung and Hsieh, 2006) . Last year's winners are strongly exposed to small cap stocks. This exposure decreases in the decile numbering but remains positive. The spread between portfolio 1 and 10 is marginally significant and explains some of the spread in raw returns: Some funds continue to earn higher returns because they are more exposed to small stocks and capture their premium. The largest spread, however, is in the momentum loadings. There is a monotonous decrease from 0. Overall, the model does a good job at explaining the returns of portfolios based on lagged fund returns. The R² ranges from 0.63 to 0.83 for the decile portfolios. This is lower than Carhart's four factor model for mutual funds, where the R²s are above 0.9. However, this is not surprising given the diversity of individual hedge fund strategies for this particular style.
When a fund has been sorted into a portfolio and tracked for a year, it can either stay in that portfolio, move to another portfolio or it may have stopped reporting during the year. To visualize the probability of a fund to move to portfolio j (or stop reporting), given it is in portfolio i, we construct a contingency table which is presented in Figure 2a . The figure shows that in general winners tend to remain winners and losers tend to remain losers. However, last year's winners are after portfolio 10 the most probable group to move to the loser portfolio.
The same is true for last year's losers: They are after portfolio 1 the most probable group to end up as this year's winners. This is in accordance with the high return variance of the extreme portfolios. There is also the tendency of the inner decile funds to remain in the inner deciles, which is consistent with their low return variance. The probability of stopping to report shows an increasing pattern with respect to last year's ranking and is highest for last year's losers. This is in line with Liang (2000), Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2001) , and Baquero, Jenke, and Verbeek (2004) who find that hedge funds with low past performance are likely candidates for liquidation. Overall, however, hedge funds move a lot between portfolio deciles and the detected patterns are not very strong.
If funds move a lot between portfolios, one expects the persistence to be short-term in nature. Figure 2b shows the average return of the portfolios in the years following the formation period. The return spread shrinks drastically in the first year after ranking. This is the weak 'hot hands' effect as identified in the table. Following the portfolios beyond one year shows no persistence at all, not even for the bad performers. 
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Detection and persistence of alpha
Forming portfolios based on lagged returns does not seem to be a useful way to detect alpha portfolios. Instead, one would like a characteristic that provides a monotonous change of alpha across the deciles. Hence, we alternatively sort funds into portfolios based on lagged alphas. 9 To provide reasonable estimates, alpha is calculated using the past 24 months of data. Table 3 provides the regression results for the decile portfolios with portfolio 1 containing the funds with the highest lagged alpha and portfolio 10 containing the funds with the lowest lagged alpha. Table 3 : Portfolios of hedge funds formed on lagged 2-year alpha Each January from 1996 to 2005, decile portfolios based on lagged 2-year alphas are formed. Portfolio 1 contains funds with the highest 2-year alpha, portfolio 10 funds with the lowest 2-year alpha. Newey-West (1987) corrected t-values are represented by *** (**,*) for 99% (95%,90%) significance. This sorting is able to identify a sizeable and significant alpha spread of a monthly 0.79%.
While the pattern is not perfectly monotonous, significant alphas are clearly located in the 18 portfolios containing the funds with high lagged alpha. Persistence in alpha is especially pronounced for the extreme portfolios 1A and 10C. However, portfolio 1A seems to be poorly explained by the factors.
The table also shows that the portfolios with significant alphas have the highest returns. In fact, sorting based on lagged alpha produces a larger return spread than a sorting based on lagged returns. The spread is a significant monthly 0.52% compared to an insignificant 0.39%
for the portfolios based on lagged returns. Hence, lagged alpha seems to provide more information about both future alpha and future raw returns. With respect to factor exposure, alpha portfolios are generally less exposed to the market. This is also shown by the 1 minus 10 portfolio at the bottom of Table 3 where the difference in the RMRF-coefficient is reported to be negative and significant at the 1% level.
Alternatively, we sort the funds based on lagged 3-year alphas. However, the alpha spread between portfolio 1 and 10 decreases to an insignificant 0.44%. There are at least two potential explanations for this decrease. First, by requiring funds to have at least three years of data to estimate 3-year alphas, the portfolios contain less funds and the estimates become less precise. In fact, the R² for portfolio 1 gets as low as 0.44. Secondly, a fund's alpha three years ago may provide few information about today's alpha. Sorting on lagged 1-year alpha, on the other hand, gives a significant 0.67% spread in alpha between portfolio 1 and 10. However, the funds' alphas are estimated very imprecisely and the portfolio alphas show no monotonous pattern. This suggests that alpha persistence is only a short-run phenomenon. The following passage takes a closer look at this. Figure 3a shows the transition probabilities of funds between portfolios sorted on lagged alphas. There is a strong pattern for funds to remain in the same portfolio or to move to adjacent portfolios. This is particularly true for the extreme deciles. Portfolio 1 containing the funds with the highest lagged alphas keeps over 30% of its funds in the following year. This confirms the results of Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2006) who find that about 20% of abnormal performance relative to the style benchmark over a three-year period spills over to the next three-year period. This persistence is stronger among top funds than among bottom funds. Moreover, the figure shows that it is very unlikely for a high-alpha fund to become a low-alpha fund in the subsequent year or vice versa. This stands in sharp contrast to highreturn funds as shown above. The probability that a fund stops reporting is decreasing in lagged alpha. This confirms the findings of Fung, Hsieh, and Naik (2007) who show that alpha-funds exhibit substantially lower liquidation rates than beta-only funds. Figure 3b shows the alphas of the portfolios over several years. Similar to sorting portfolios based on lagged returns, the spread decreases after the formation period though not as strongly. There is clearly more persistence in alpha than in raw returns for the first year. As in Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2005) abnormal performance is significant and persists over one year. While much of the persistence in alpha is gone after one year, the worst performers continue to underperform for two years. The alpha spread even widens to 0.97%. But both the winner and loser portfolios have alphas insignificantly different from zero after the tracking year and the alpha spread is only significant at the 5%-level. Hence, portfolios based on 20 lagged alphas should be reformed annually as there is no outperformance two, three, and four years after picking the high alpha funds.
The results are similar when we alternatively sort the funds based on the t-value of lagged alphas which is the same as sorting based on the appraisal ratio. This sorting procedure identifies a highly significant alpha spread of 0.84% and a return spread of 0.58%. Carhart (1997) , however, argues that using the same model for sorting and performance evaluation can pick up a model bias. For example, if the factor exposures are estimated too low or too high for a fund, this shows up as persistent over-or underperformance relative to the factor model. The problem is similar to an omitted factor. Hence, it is important to keep in mind this potential shortcoming when interpreting the results reported in this section.
Finally, we sort the funds into portfolios based on lagged Sharpe Ratios. This does a better job at detecting alpha portfolios than sorting based on raw returns or return variance and generates a decreasing pattern in alphas across deciles. In contrast, the reported results based on alpha sorting are stronger. For space reasons, we do not report the results from the Sharpe Ratio sorting.
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Robustness Checks
Subperiod analysis
In order to assess the robustness of these results, we conduct the analyses for subperiods.
Prior research examines the relation between hedge fund performance and market conditions.
Using a conditional benchmark, Kat and Miffre (2002) conclude that abnormal performance is counter-cyclical. Capocci, Corhay, and Huebner (2005) The results for lagged 2-year alpha sorts are shown in Table 4 and confirm the previous findings also for the subperiods. Alpha portfolios have generally higher returns and lower factor exposures, especially for the market. Again, alpha persistence is much stronger than return persistence (not reported) over the 1-year horizon. Buying funds with the highest lagged alpha and reforming annually delivers high returns, relatively low market exposure and positive alpha. For example, while the mean monthly market return over the second subperiod was -0.16%, portfolio 1 with low market exposure earned a monthly return of 0.4% and positive (but insignificant) alpha. In addition, Table 4 shows that looking at the excess returns, hedge funds have clearly performed much better in the bull-market period. Given their net long market exposure, this is not surprising. 
Correction for 'stale prices'
The presence of 'stale prices' because of hard-to-price assets or managed prices can artificially reduce fund statistics such as volatility or beta. Suppose the market falls near the end of the month and an illiquid asset does not trade, the drop in price will not show up until the following month. Or a manager uses his flexibility to mark the positions in a way to reduce vola-tility and/or market beta. Consequently, both illiquidity and managed prices can lead to asynchronous price reactions. This can spuriously show up as alpha because the contemporaneous factors will lose explanatory power. To check the robustness of our results with respect to stale prices, we use the procedure proposed by Getmansky, Lo, and Marakov (2004) to adjust the raw return series for potential smoothing. We estimate their MA(2) model for all equity long/short hedge funds in the CISDM database to obtain the smoothing parameters (or teta coefficients) based on which we construct 'unsmoothed' return series. The results are reported in Table 5 for the alpha sorts and show that the correction leaves the results qualitatively unchanged. 
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Conclusion
This paper investigates the performance persistence of equity long/short hedge funds. We find returns to show very little persistence at the annual horizon irrespective of the length of the formation period. In addition, the observed persistence can be fully explained by factor exposures. In fact, it is mainly driven by holdings of last year's winner stocks. Hence, funds with the highest return last period are generally no alpha-funds. Moreover, best and worst performing funds tend to switch their places often as they are very volatile.
However, there are more promising criteria to select outperforming funds. Sharpe Ratio, market beta and in particular alpha are more useful characteristics to sort funds because they are more persistent than raw returns. Although not reported in the paper, we find that sorting on lagged Sharpe Ratio identifies portfolios with the highest Sharpe Ratio which are also more likely to have alpha. Sorting on lagged market beta or alpha identifies the largest and most significant alpha spread over the subsequent period. Past alpha also provides the most information about future returns by discovering the most significant spread in raw returns.
These selection strategies are associated with less risk than selection based on raw returns.
Funds with high alpha are very unlikely to have a low alpha in the next period, instead, they will likely stay in the same or adjacent portfolio. Also, there is more persistence in alpha at the annual horizon. However, no persistence in alpha has been detected for longer horizons except that funds with the lowest alpha continue to have the lowest alpha for two years.
However, there are at least three reasons that render such trading strategies impractical.
First, the option of going short a portfolio of hedge funds to get the alpha spread is not available. Secondly, the transaction and administrative costs of implementing such a strategy may outweigh its benefits. Thirdly, lockup or redemption periods imposed by funds can make frequent disinvestment impossible. However, selecting funds with the highest lagged alpha already produces a significant monthly alpha of 0.71% while the spread between portfolio 1 and
